Tony Blair has been proven a liar regarding the 2003 invasion of Iraq. Following the release of the Chilcot report, Blair was left with no option but to beg the British people to understand his decision.
However, the British people are finding it harder and harder to understand.
"I had to decide. I thought of Saddam, his record and the character of his regime… and took decision with the heaviest of hearts," Blair argued. "There was no middle way. The decision had to be taken… and it was mine to take."
However, the Chilcot report's main argument is that military action was not the last resort. "Intervention may have been needed at some point but in March 2003, there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein" the report said.
If so, the Chilcot report has already challenged Blair's claim that there was no middle ground. By making a statement to that effect after the release of the Chilcot Report, Blair is questioning and challenging its conclusions.
Meanwhile, Blair is yet to convincingly explain how it was decided that Saddam Hussein posed a threat. This becomes even harder when the Chilcot Report's conclusion of the Iraqi 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' programme is taken into account.
Releasing the report, Sir John Chilcot said that the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction were “presented with a certainty that was not justified.”
Once again, Blair has to explain this point in detail, because the threat of the WMDs was used to justify the war in Iraq.
The Chilcot report also blames Blair for towing the U.S. line, failing to consider the British interests.
“The UK’s relationship with the US has proved strong enough over time to bear the weight of honest disagreement. It does not require unconditional support where our interests or judgements differ” John Chilcot said while releasing the report.
In July 2002, well over six months before the invasion of Iraq, Blair wrote to then-US President George Bush promising him that the UK would be there with him “whatever,” Chilcot said. In short, he had given assurance to the US even before conclusive proof of WMDs.
Chilcot also went on to say how Blair blamed the French government for the 'impasse' regarding getting support for military action in the UN Security Council. It seems that the British government applied undue pressure on the French by making such claims. This revelation casts a doubt on the Blair government's sincerity within the UN and outside, in forging a genuine alliance to attack Iraq.
However, the British people are finding it harder and harder to understand.
"I had to decide. I thought of Saddam, his record and the character of his regime… and took decision with the heaviest of hearts," Blair argued. "There was no middle way. The decision had to be taken… and it was mine to take."
However, the Chilcot report's main argument is that military action was not the last resort. "Intervention may have been needed at some point but in March 2003, there was no imminent threat from Saddam Hussein" the report said.
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| Pic: Damien Gayle (Twitter @damiengayle) |
If so, the Chilcot report has already challenged Blair's claim that there was no middle ground. By making a statement to that effect after the release of the Chilcot Report, Blair is questioning and challenging its conclusions.
Meanwhile, Blair is yet to convincingly explain how it was decided that Saddam Hussein posed a threat. This becomes even harder when the Chilcot Report's conclusion of the Iraqi 'Weapons of Mass Destruction' programme is taken into account.
Releasing the report, Sir John Chilcot said that the severity of the threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction were “presented with a certainty that was not justified.”
Once again, Blair has to explain this point in detail, because the threat of the WMDs was used to justify the war in Iraq.
The Chilcot report also blames Blair for towing the U.S. line, failing to consider the British interests.
“The UK’s relationship with the US has proved strong enough over time to bear the weight of honest disagreement. It does not require unconditional support where our interests or judgements differ” John Chilcot said while releasing the report.
In July 2002, well over six months before the invasion of Iraq, Blair wrote to then-US President George Bush promising him that the UK would be there with him “whatever,” Chilcot said. In short, he had given assurance to the US even before conclusive proof of WMDs.
Chilcot also went on to say how Blair blamed the French government for the 'impasse' regarding getting support for military action in the UN Security Council. It seems that the British government applied undue pressure on the French by making such claims. This revelation casts a doubt on the Blair government's sincerity within the UN and outside, in forging a genuine alliance to attack Iraq.
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